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INTRODUCTION 
Since European agencies experienced a boom in 
the 2000s, the EU legislator has always granted 
them more power.1 New, decentralised agencies 
were created in response to the financial crisis. 
Today, agencies are again presented as solutions 
to the challenges facing Europe, such as the 
refugee crisis, cyber-attacks, posted workers and 
terrorism. 
In his 2018 State of the Union address, 
President Juncker proposed to strengthen the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
(Frontex) with an additional 10,000 operating 
staff by 2020. Last year he announced the 
creation of a European Labour Authority and 
the transformation of the EU Agency for 
Network and Information Security into a fully-
fledged Cybersecurity Agency by doubling its 
budget.2 In its proposals for the next 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the 
Commission decided to step up activities of EU 
agencies in the areas of security, border and 
migration management, whose budget should 
rise from €4.2 billion to €14 billion. 
This budgetary increase for agencies who deal 
with the most pressing and critical challenges in 
Europe, reflects how suited they are to 
delivering EU policies. The EU already spends 
today ten times more than it did 15 years ago on 
its agencies, which further increases their 
importance in the EU institutional landscape.3 
But it remains only a marginal expenditure of 
the EU budget, amounting to 0,8% and costing 
The European institutions are not always 
able to address crises in a timely manner 
due to the cumbersome decision-making 
process. European agencies often provide 
the most appropriate response to the 
concerns of citizens and businesses that are 
experienced across the single market. They 
should be granted greater autonomy to 
bring to life EU policies while being made 
more responsible. At a time of growing 
uncertainties, the EU needs to further 
develop existing EU agencies and create 
new ones for addressing new cross-border 
challenges. A common legal framework 
should also be created for all EU agencies 
in order to harmonize their overall 
functioning. 
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every inhabitant €2,35 per year.4 In this context, 
the crucial question is whether the EU is making 
the right choice by delegating more power to 
agencies. 
In this Policy Brief, we argue that extending the 
scope of agencies would be a positive step for 
the EU. We set out criteria to understand why 
EU agencies are often more suited than national 
competent authorities (NCAs). EU agencies are 
a way to exert powers at the most relevant level 
and provide adequate solutions to problems met 
by businesses and citizens, thanks to their 
expertise and impartial approach. We also 
advocate a broader interpretation of powers that 
can be delegated to EU agencies. Granting more 
autonomy to EU agencies would strengthen the 
efficiency of the EU’s action, without 
threatening its democratic dimension, as EU 
legislators would still be able to control agencies’ 
activities. 
KEY ACTORS FOR DELIVERING EU 
POLICIES EFFICIENTLY 
Five reasons explain why EU agencies are very 
efficient in implementing EU policies. They (1) 
tackle problems with a cross-border dimension, 
(2) pool together EU expertise, (3) provide 
independent advices to the EU legislator, (4) 
offer cost-efficient solutions and (5) also 
increase the Union’s visibility by being spread 
across Member States. 
First, a growing number of issues are better 
solved at European level. New EU agencies are 
created for taking over competences previously 
exercised by NCAs. They coordinate Member 
States’ actions to tackle problems faced by 
economic actors. The new EU Cybersecurity 
Agency aims to prevent cyber-attacks, which 
know no borders and can be harmful to the 
stability of the EU economy.5 From 2019, the 
European Labour Authority will ease the 
exchange of information between Member 
States and ensure that EU rules on labour 
mobility are enforced in practice. From 2020, 
the EU Public Prosecutor’s Office will 
prosecute terrorist cases and crimes against the 
EU’s financial interests, including cross-border 
VAT fraud cases. 
Second, EU agencies are often preferred to 
NCAs as they meet the increasing requirements 
for technical expertise and bring together 
knowledge from across Europe. EU agencies 
can implement policies more efficiently in their 
area of competences as they operate in a 
centralised manner compared to 28 dispersed 
NCAs. Experience has shown that national 
solutions are insufficient when it comes to the 
refugee crisis, which requires coordination and 
expertise at the European level. Frontex will 
therefore be allocated €12 billion in the new 
MFF.6 
Third, the actions of EU agencies are highly 
relevant as they take a neutral approach in 
managing problems and prevent “gold-plating” 
practices of national regulators. They make the 
general interest of EU citizens prevail over 
vested interests. The EU Food Security 
Authority, for instance, provides independent 
scientific advice on food risks and thus supports 
policy-makers in taking decisions.7 
Fourth, EU agencies are also a way to save 
money in pooling competences previously 
exercised at national level. The resources 
allocated by each Member State to its own NCA 
are made available to a single EU Agency, that 
usually needs only a smaller budget than the sum 
of NCA budgets. This concentration of 
technical and human capacity allows significant 
economies of scale. EU agencies reduce the 
administrative burden for companies, which 
only need a single point of contact to access the 
EU market. The EU Medicines Agency (EMA) 
conduct scientific evaluation of applications for 
marketing authorisations that, once granted, are 
valid in all Member States.  
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Last, the geographical distribution of EU 
agencies throughout the Member States makes 
Europe more visible for its citizens, from 
Lisbon to Tallinn. Local businesses profit from 
supporting agencies activities. Their importance 
is demonstrated by the rivalry between 
European capitals over the relocation of 
agencies after Brexit. The move of 900 EMA 
employees to Amsterdam and of 150 employees 
of the EU Banking Authority (EBA) to Paris 
will have broad consequences, especially since 
stakeholders remain close to regulators. For 
instance, many financial services industry 
workers could move to the continent and 
stimulate the local economy. 
FURTHER EMPOWERING EU AGENCIES 
The reliability and effectiveness of EU agencies 
calls for granting them still more autonomy, 
although efforts have already been made in this 
direction. In 2011, the three EU Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) were given significant 
powers to prevent a new financial crisis.8 They 
ensure supervisory convergence, issue guidance 
but also have direct “product intervention 
powers”, which allow them to ban a product in 
the EU. For instance, the EU Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) decided in June 
2018 to prohibit two kinds of financial products 
to protect investors.9 ESAs might soon have 
even greater powers if the new regulation on 
financial supervision is adopted. 
This extensive conferral of powers has been 
questioned in the light of the Meroni case-law. 
The latter allows EU institutions to delegate 
only strictly defined competences to EU 
agencies but no “discretionary power implying a 
wide margin of discretion”.10 Some considered 
that powers conferred to ESMA exceeded the 
limits that were laid down by the CJEU in 1958, 
which considers the EU legislator to remain 
solely responsible for political choices. 
However, the Court agreed with this delegation 
of powers as they were precisely delineated and 
under the control of EU institutions.11 
It is now time to interpret the Meroni doctrine 
with greater flexibility. The very narrow 
interpretation of “discretionary powers” 
complicates the regulatory process and creates 
additional bureaucracy. This overly 
precautionary approach forces the legislator to 
prepare highly prescriptive mandates for EU 
agencies, while not being equipped with 
sufficient technical knowledge. Instead, the EU 
legislator should set principle-based law that 
would allow agencies to be more flexible in 
finding the best ways to apply the agreed legal 
framework. One may wonder if supposed legal 
certainty is more important than the ability of 
EU agencies to respond more adequately to 
businesses’ and citizens’ concerns. 
Since EU law has become increasingly detailed 
and prescriptive, agencies are now instrumental 
in developing secondary laws and guidelines. 
The level of expertise provided by EU agencies 
is in line with the Commission’s commitment to 
improve the policy-making process. Aiming to 
enhance its efficiency, the Better Regulation 
Package prioritizes expertise over politics.12 This 
is also the case for EU agencies, which act 
within the framework defined by EU legislators. 
Greater flexibility for the EU agencies’ 
functioning should be accompanied by a 
commitment to meet legally-enshrined 
deadlines. At present, the Commission 
frequently fails to respect the time limits for 
secondary legislation. For instance, ESAs are 
often tasked to prepare draft “technical 
standards”, which then need to be adopted by 
the Commission. The deadlines are strictly set, 
but as a rule the Commission takes longer, either 
due to political interests or resource 
constraints.13 It is a paradox that the Guardian 
of the Treaties fails to impose high standards 
upon its own staff. The Parliament and the 
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Council should denounce these delays more 
systematically. 
IMPROVING EU GOVERNANCE 
After the “last chance Commission”, the Union 
could find its salvation through the growing 
importance of agencies in the implementation of 
EU policies. Whilst some might fear a power 
grab by these agencies and a weakening of the 
political dimension of the EU’s action, the 
reality would be very different, if certain 
safeguards accompany the empowerment of 
agencies. 
The notion of ‘government by agency’ could be 
criticised along similar lines as the so-called 
‘judicial activism’ that bedevils CJEU case-law. 
Yet such an agency-centric approach might not 
be a negative evolution. Facing the growing 
complexity of EU issues, the European 
Parliament often lacks expertise and looks for 
solutions through EU agencies. MEPs hand 
over competences to agencies more easily, 
sometimes because of their inability to agree on 
technical specifics rather than their willingness 
to empower agencies. Member States more 
often believe that agencies should decide only 
on the technical aspects of political decisions. 
This dynamic results in prescriptive mandates 
for the agencies that take a long time to 
negotiate, leave little room for manoeuvre and 
often prove to be flawed (in turn requiring 
amendments later). 
Handing more powers to EU agencies could 
also have downsides. The experts in one area 
might be missing the bigger picture. The EU 
budget is limited and needs to be attributed 
based on political priorities. Therefore, it 
remains essential for the Council to steer the EU 
and for the Commission to ensure policy 
coherence. 
The expansion of agencies’ remit could be 
accompanied by measures improving their 
democratic legitimacy and transparency. Article 
15 TFEU states that agencies shall conduct their 
work as openly as possible in order to promote 
good governance. Each year the European 
Parliament approves, and the Court of Auditors 
controls, the budget of EU agencies. If agencies 
are granted more freedom to bring European 
policies to life, they should also be made more 
responsible. An annual hearing of every EU 
agency executive director should be held in the 
European Parliament to report on all agency 
activities. 
New agencies could be set up to fulfil tasks that 
are more relevant to organise at EU level than at 
national level. The idea of an EU agency for 
anti-money laundering and financial crime was 
recently raised, as well as a new agency to 
organise the distribution of refugees. If new 
agencies are created, their increasing diversity 
could make the decision-making process harder 
to understand. While one size does not fit all 
situations, the proliferation of agencies 
nonetheless calls for the adoption of a common 
(legal) framework. Such a streamlined set of 
procedures would harmonise their functioning 
and make agency work easier to understand. 
CONCLUSION 
Europe is facing a growing number of 
challenges that are better addressed by all 
Member States acting in common. Be it 
migratory flows, cyber space threats or financial 
crimes, these challenges cut across borders, and 
the EU needs to address them efficiently. The 
Commission rightly proposed to set up agencies 
to meet technical challenges that feature a 
European dimension. EU agencies take 
measures that are appropriate to present-day 
realities, but they also face artificial limits of the 
half-century old Meroni case. However, should 
these remain fundamental obstacles? 
EU agencies offer the best answer to the most 
technical questions in their respective area of 
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expertise. As such, they can provide added value 
and not just an additional layer of bureaucracy if 
there is sufficient political will. Legislators need 
to be more courageous to adopt principle-based 
laws. EU agencies need to act with greater 
autonomy, while keeping in mind that the CJEU 
still has a final say on the interpretation of these 
laws. 
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ENDNOTES  
 
1 The number of EU decentralised agencies has grown from 11 in 2000 to 28 in 2005. There are currently 44 EU 
agencies across the Union: 36 decentralised agencies and 8 joint undertakings (public-private partnerships). 
2 The Commission’s proposal provides for an increase of the agency budget from €11 million to €23 million within 
four years. This doubling of budget remains insufficient. It will not match the increase in tasks for the agency, which 
has a broader mandate since the entry into force of the directive on security of network and information systems in 
2016. 
3 The EU spent €95 million in 2000 and €937 million in 2015. The increase has been lower from 2010, as the EU 
contribution to decentralised agencies had already reached €706 million. European Commission, “Programming of 
human and financial resources for decentralised agencies 2014-2020”, July 2013, COM (2013) 519 final, p. 11. 
4 According to the EU Agencies Network, EU Agencies have currently a total budget of €1,2 billion per year. 
5 The creation of a 24/7 crisis centre was recently proposed to better protect businesses and infrastructures across 
Europe. Catherine Stupp, “Cybersecurity agency hopes for 24/7 crisis response centre in Brussels”, Euractiv, 7 June 
2018. 
6 For the same reasons, the Agency for Asylum budget will be doubled and make the Common Asylum System more 
coherent. 
7 Although ESFA aims to provide independent analysis, the agency is not infallible. In 2017, EFSA assessed that 
glyphosate was safe for public use, based on a report which parts simply quoted Monsanto-funded studies. 
8 The European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) were created in 2011. 
9 www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-adopts-final-product-intervention-measures-cfds 
10 Cases C-9/56 and C-10/56, Meroni v High Authority, 1957/1958. 
11 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council, 2014. 
12 Charles de Marcilly, Matthias Touillon, The "Better Regulation" programme: expertise over politics?, European issues, 
Robert Schuman Foundation, 2015. 
13 Within three months of receipt of a draft regulatory technical standard submitted by EBA, ESMA or EIOPA, the 
Commission shall decide whether to endorse it or to amend it. This deadline is however often not respected. The eight 
technical standards drafted by ESMA on 30 March 2017 under the Benchmarks Regulation were adopted by the 
Commission only on 13 July 2018. 
 
 
